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ABSTRACT 
The use of land and natural resources is governed in New Zealand by the Resource 
Management Act 1991. The Act provides that before certain activities are undertaken, a 
resource consent must be obtained from the local authority. The decision of the consent 
authority is clearly of considerable importance to any person or business wishing to 
undertake development activities. It is thus vital that the discretion conferred on the 
authority be exercised in accordance with clearly established principles. Judicial 
scrutiny provides a means of ensming that these powers are correctly exercised. In 
recognition of these principles, the RMA makes provision for appeal against the 
decisions of consent authorities. However it does not make clear the role envisaged for 
judicial review. 
This paper considers the role of judicial review in the resource consent process. The 
aim of the paper is to identify the scope of review in relation to consent decisions, and 
to contrast its role with that of the appeal process provided for by the Act. The paper 
looks at the nature of the decision exercised by the consent authority, and notes the 
uncertainty and complexity of the evidence it must consider. The paper then looks to 
the different ways in which the decision can be challenged through the courts, and 
analyses the respective roles of appeal and review in the consent process. It concludes 
that judicial review is not ideally suited to scrutiny of the initial consent decision and 
that this function is better performed by the Planning Tribunal which has the necessary 
expertise. However despite the existence of a further right of appeal to the High Court, 
it is argued that there may be a role for judicial review of the Planning Tribunal 
decision. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and annexures) comprises 
approximately 17,804 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
As might be expected in a property-owning democracy, 
governmental controls over the use and development of 
land have provoked sorne of the most intense disputes 
about the proper exercise of official power. 
De Smith, para 22-001. 
The Resource Management Act 1991 ("the RMA" or "the Act") was introduced as a 
radical reform and consolidation of natural resource and planning law in New Zealand. 
It establishes a new framework for the regulation of a wide range of activities involving 
the use of natural resources. As well as its effects on the individual and its implications 
for the environment, the Act has an important impact on commercial development. Of 
particular importance is the requirement that a resource consent be obtained from the 
local authority before certain activities are undertaken. In exercising its discretion, the 
local authority must consider a wide range of criteria, and assess whether the proposed 
activity is consistent with the purpose and principles of the Act. It is a decision which 
may require the consideration of complex scientific evidence as well as the interpretation 
of the purpose and principles of the Act. 
The considerable impact of the decision means that it is vital that it be exercised 
according to clearly established principles. Professor Geoffrey Walker notes that the 
courts have an important role in this respect, stating that "there must be effective 
procedures and institutions such as the judicial review of executive action to ensure that 
government action is also in accordance with law." 1 This function is traditionally 
exercised by the courts upon an application for judicial review. In New Zealand judicial 
review is available under the High Court rules and under the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 ("the JAA"). However the drafters of the RMA clearly envisaged that judicial 
scrutiny of decision making under the Act would take place by way of appeal. In fact it 
appears that the role of judicial review was not much considered during the resource 
management reforms, and the scope for its use under the Act remains unclear. The 
purpose of this paper is to assess the potential for judicial review of the consent 
process, and to contrast its role with that of appeal. 
Geoffrey De Q Walker The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Melbourne 
University Press, 1988), 29. 
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Part II of this paper locates the decisions of consent authorities within the structure of 
the Act, and outlines the nature of environmental decision making. The different means 
of challenging these decisions are examined in Part III. The different levels of appeal 
are outlined and discussed, and the role of review is explored. In Part IV the different 
procedures are compared and evaluated. Part V concludes the paper. 
Although the Resource Management Amendment Bill (No 4) has recently changed the 
name of the Planning Tribunal to the "Environment Court", for the purposes of this 
paper it will continue to be referred to as the Planning T1ibunal. 
II NATURE OF THE DECISIONS BEING CHALLENGED 
A Powers and Functions Conferred by the Act 
The RMA confers a wide variety of decision making powers on a number of different 
bodies. While it is proposed in this paper to focus on decisions made by local 
authorities in the resource consent process, it is useful to first locate these decisions 
within the framework of the Act. Thus for example, the Minister for the Environment 
is assigned the role of monito1ing the overall effect and implementation of the Act, 
making regulations to establish national environmental standards, calling-in a resource 
consent application which concern a matter of national significance, as well as 
approving a body to act as a heritage protection authority or a network utility requiiing 
authority.2 Under Part IV of the Act the Minister is given certain "residual" powers in 
order that these functions be carried out. 3 The key function of the Minister of 
Conservation is in the preparation of national coastal policy statements, and the 
approval of regional coastal plans and permits.4 The Minister of Conservation also has 
the continuing functions of monitoring the effect of the statements and coastal permits 
issued.5 
However, it is the regional councils and tenito1ial auth01ities, known collectively as 
local authorities, who are allocated the primary decision making responsibilities under 
the Act. These responsibilities include both policy formulation and policy 
implementation functions. Thus regional body functions include establishing and 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Kenneth Palmer Local government law in New 'Zealand (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1993), 
584. 
RMA s 25. 
RMA s 28. 
Above n 2, 585 . 
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implementing objectives, policies and methods to achieve integrated management of the 
natural and physical resources of the region. These rules and policies then become the 
regional plan. Regional councils also have control over soil conservation, water use 
and water quality maintenance, hazardous substances, and discharges of contaminants 
into water or air. Territorial authorities has the function of establishing policies and 
plans concerning land use, storage of hazardous substances, control of subdivision of 
land, control of emission of noise and control of activities on the surface of water in 
rivers and lakes. These policies and plans in turn fonn the basis of the district plan. 
4 
As part of their implementation function outlined above, regional bodies and territorial 
authorities hear applications for "resource consents". Any activity which is not a 
"permitted activity" under the relevant regional or district plan will require the 
authorisation of the local authority in the form of a resource consent. The five different 
types of resource consent provided for by the Act are a land use consent, a subdivision 
consent, a coastal permit, a water pennit and a discharge permit. The district or 
regional plan may also classify a certain activity as a permitted activity, a discretionary 
activity, a non-complying activity or a prohibited activity. An application for a resource 
consent cannot be made in respect of a prohibited activity and need not be made in 
respect of a permitted activity. However an application for a certificate of compliance 
may be made for any permitted activity. 
An application for a resource consent must be made in the prescribed form. It should 
include a description of the proposed activity and its location, as well as an assessment 
of the actual and potential effects on the environment and ways in which those effects 
might be mitigated. Unless the application meets the criteria for non-notification, the 
consent authority must then notify specified persons including every person who is 
known to be an owner or occupier of land to which the application relates. Notice must 
also be served on other local authorities and local iwi authorities where the authority 
thinks it is appropriate. Where an application has been publicly notified, any person 
can make a submission in writing to the consent authmity. A hearing is required only if 
the consent authority believes it is necessary or if a submitter has expressed the desire to 
be heard in respect of the application. In making a decision on the application, the 
consent authority should have regard to any effects on the environment of allowing the 
activity, any relevant regulations, policy statement, or plan, and any other matters 
considered relevant. The decision must be made subject to Part II of the Act which 
contains its purpose and principles. However it should be noted that while the Act 
specifies some consideration to which the local body must have regard, it provides few 
substantive rules. Subject to the provisions of the Act, the consent authority may also 
impose a number of conditions on the grant of the consent. 
B Nature of Environmental Decision Making 
Decisions made under the RMA are complicated by the fact that they deal not only with 
the rights and obligations of parties directly affected, but also with the wider 
environmental impact of the decision. Environmental disputes have been described as 
essentially "public" disputes because they involve not only the rights of individuals to 
undertake certain activities, but also questions of community values concerning the 
appropriate balance between economic development and environmental preservation. 
This potential conflict of objectives is encapsulated in s 5 of the RMA which contains 
the sole purpose of the Act of "sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources". 6 The definition of" sustainable management" makes reference to providing 
for the social, economic and cultural wellbeing of communities while safeguarding 
ecosystems and avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects on the environment.7 It is 
still unclear what degree of priority is confeITed on ecological concerns by the section, 
and to what extent these must be balanced against competing social, economic or 
cultural considerations. 8 However it is argued that the public nature of these decisions 
heightens the need for decision makers to be accountable to the public, and for the 
public to be able to enforce that responsibility through the courts.9 
Another characteristic of environmental decision making is that it involves consideration 
of complex scientific evidence. That evidence is often uncertain, and there are few 
objective standards against which to measure the effect of any activity on the 
environment. 10 While in scientific terms there may be no answer to the question 
whether an activity will have an adverse environmental effect, in law there must be such 
an answer. Even where there are objective standards, there may be disagreement as to 
interpretation of those standards and the inferences that can be drawn from them. It has 
been suggested therefore that these decisions are better left to expert agencies, rather 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
RMA s 5(1). 
RMA s 5(2). 
See D Fisher "The Resource Management Legislation of 1991 : A Juridical Analysis of its 
Objectives in Brookers Resource Management Act (1991) Vo! 1; B Harris "Sustainable 
Management as an Express Purpose of Environmental Legislation; The New Zealand Attempt" 
(1993) 8 Otago Law Review 51; B Pardy "Sustainability: An Ecological Definition for the 
Resource Management Act 1991" (1993) 15 NZULR 351; K Grundy "In search of a logic: s5 of 
the Resource Management Act 1991" [1995] NZLJ 40. 
Gary Meyers "Meeting Public Expectations - Judicial Review of Environmental Impact 
Statements in the United States: Lessons for reform in Western Australia?" (1996) 3 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law, para 6. 
Above n 9, para 4. 
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than being subject to review by traditional or even specialist courts. 11 However it is 
also argued that courts deal with complex and unce1tain matters all the time and that 
scientific complexity is a "shibboleth" which should not serve to prevent scrutiny of 
official decision making.12 
11 
12 
Above n 9, para 5. 
Above n 9, para 11. 
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III WAYS IN WHICH DECISIONS CAN BE CHALLENGED 
A Appeal to the Planning Tribunal 
1 Nature of the review conducted by the Tribunal 
As noted above, the primary mechanism for challenge to decisions of consent 
authorities is though appeal to the Planning Tribunal. The decision to provide for an 
initial appeal to a specialist tribunal accords with the finding of the Legislation Advisory 
Committee that such bodies may be better suited to the role of implementing and 
developing the policy established by Parliament than would be the ordinary courts.13 
However, despite its name, the Tribunal has always been a Court of Record and is 
required to act in a judicial manner. Thus its recent change of name to "Environment 
Court" perhaps more accurately reflects its status. Nevertheless, the Tribunal does 
possess some of the qualities of an ordinary tiibunal 14 in that formalities are kept to a 
minimum15 and parties do not have to be represented by lawyers thereby allowing for 
wide public participation.16 Perhaps most importantly, the Tiibunal is a specialist body 
which hears only resource management appeals and is staffed by specialist Planning 
Judges17 who are District Court Judges with a background in environmental and 
resource management law. It is interesting also to note that the Legislation Advisory 
Committee must have considered the Tribunal to have the functions of an ordinary 
tribunal by including it in its report on administrative tiibunals. 18 For the purposes of 
this paper, therefore, the Tribunal will be treated as possessing the characteiistics of a 
tribunal, while keeping in mind that it does exercise the powers of a court. 
A right of appeal to the Planning Tribunal is conferred bys 120 on the applicant for the 
resource consent and any person who has made a submission in respect of the 
application. On appeal, the Planning Tribunal hears the application de novo, 19 and may 
confirm, amend or cancel a decision to which the appeal relates. 20 It should be noted 
that the Tribunal does not assess whether the decision of the consent authority was 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Legislation Advisory Committee Administrative Tribunals - Report No 3 (Wellington, 1989), 
para 42. 
The Franks Committee listed some of those qualities as "cheapness, accessibility, freedom from 
technicality, expedition and expert knowledge" . Report of the Commiuee on Administrative 
Tribunals and Enquiries (1957) Cmnd 218. ("the Franks Committee Report"), 9. 
David Sheppard "The why, who and how of resource management appeals" (1996) 1 
Butteiworths Resource Management Bulletin 195, 196. 
Although note discussion of standing requirements below Part III A2. 
Subsequent to the 1996 Amendment Act they are now known as Environment Judges. 
Above n 13. 
RMA s 290(1) . 
RMA s 290(2). 
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correct, but gives its own decision in place of that of the consent authority.21 This 
process encourages greater openness and impartiality in council decision ma.king. 
However the focus of the appeal procedure is not on the decision making process itself, 
but rather on whether the correct decision was reached on the facts of the case at hand. 
8 
It is interesting also to note the different types of dispute the Tribunal is required to 
adjudicate, and the different parties which may be involved. At one level the Tribunal is 
required to exercise an essential function of administrative tribunals in striking the 
balance between private right and public interest.22 Sheppard notes that one of the 
primary aims of establishing an appeal system was to "ensure that there is justice as 
between the people and the authority, to hold the scales of justice ... and to preserve the 
rights of the individual" .23 However, the Tribunal hears a large number of disputes 
between one individual and another. In such cases there is also usually a broader public 
interest in the quality of the environment which transcends the private interest of the 
individual disputants. 24 While patties may not present these arguments, the Tribunal is 
required by the Act to consider them in deciding whether or not a consent should be 
granted. The appeal process is also seen to protect the rights and interests of minority 
sections of the community in that there is a perceived need to counterbalance the fact 
that the local autho1ity is an elected body and therefore reliant on majoiity support.25 
Thus it can be seen that the Planning Tribunal adjudicates in a number of different types 
of dispute. In each of these cases the Tribunal exercises the important function of 
ensuring that the rules established by the Act are applied equally as between disputing 
parties. The fact that the Tribunal heai-s the appeal de novo gives it a wide power of 
review. However the breadth and effectiveness of that power will be affected by limits 
on who can participate in the process and the quality of evidence which is put before it. 
2 Standing 
As noted in the preceding section, one of the aims of appeal to the Planning Tribunal is 
to allow for wide public participation. This ensures that info1med decisions are made, 
and that public confidence in the system is retained. Unfortunately, however, these 
objectives have been unde1mined by the development of highly rest1ictive standing 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Above 11 15, 196. Sec discussion below Pa.rt III D1 (a)(ii) as to whelher the jurisdiction of Lhe 
Planning Tribunal is appellate or original. 
Above 11 13, 15. 
Above 11 15, 194. 
Above 11 13, 21; Above 11 34, 195. 
Above 11 15, 195. 
rules. As the following analysis will show, such a development is both unnecessary, 
and contrary to modem developments in relation to rules on standing. 
9 
Standing to appear before the Tribunal is determined bys 274 of the Act. That 
provision grants standing to the Minister for the Environment, any local authority, any 
person having any interest in the proceedings greater than the public generally, and any 
party to the proceedings. Ass 120 confers appeal rights on any person who has made a 
submission at the consent hearing, any such objector will have standing under s 274 by 
virtue of being a party to proceedings. However the position becomes more 
complicated where a person who failed to exercise their right to make a submission at 
the consent hearing stage wishes to appear when the case is appealed. This situation 
might arise, for example, where the significance of the matter does not become apparent 
until the appeal stage. Similarly, a person may wish to appear at an appeal hearing 
where there has been no right to make submissions. In order to obtain standing in these 
circumstances, that person will have to bring themselves within the "interest in the 
proceedings greater than the public generally" limb. Past practice would have 
suggested that this should be a straightforward exercise.26 However as it will be seen, 
the Planning Tribunal has taken a highly restrictive interpretation to this phrase in recent 
cases. 
(a) Tribunal decisions on standing 
The first case which indicated a narrnwing of standing requirements was Purification 
Technologies Ltd v Taupo District Councif.27 That case involved an appeal by the 
applicant against a decision to refuse it a certificate of compliance for a proposed 
commercial gamma radiation plant. There is no opportunity to make submissions in 
relation to an application for a certificate of compliance, thus the only parties to the 
proceedings were the applicant and the Council. However a number of interested 
groups wished to appear at the hearing. They claimed that they had standing on the 
basis they had an interest in proceedings greater than the public generally. The Tribunal 
found that over half those wishing to appear, including Greenpeace New Zealand Inc, 
Friends of the Earth, a group named Reject lITadiation Plant, and four local residents 
had insufficient interest in the proceedings. 
In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal stated that the standing provisions in the RMA 
were different from those of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 ("the TCPA"). 
26 
27 
See for example Body Corporate 97010 v Auckland City Council (1993) 2 NZRMA 257 in 
which the Civic Trusl Auckland Inc were granted standing lo support local residents under the 
former equivalents 157 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. 
[1995) NZRMA 197. 
Sheppard J noted that although the wording of s 157 of the TCPA was substantively the 
same ass 174 of the RMA, there was no equivalent to s 2(3) of the TCPA which made 
special provision for representation by public interest groups. He also noted that the 
RMA made wider provision for non-notification of resource consents than the earlier 
legislation. In the absence of any New Zealand case law on the interpretation of the 
phrase "an interest greater than the public generally" the Judge looked at a number of 
Australian and Canadian cases concerning similar statutory provisions. He placed 
particular reliance on the decision of the Australian High Court in Australian 
Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth of Australia.28 In that case it was held 
that a person did not have a sufficient interest to be granted standing on an application 
for judicial review where the interest was a mere intellectual or emotional concern. The 
Court stated that it was necessary for a person to be "likely to gain some advantage, 
other than the satisfaction of righting a wrong, upholding a p1inciple or winning 
consent" .29 Applying this reasoning in the case before him, Sheppard J stated that 
where there was no right of intervention for third parties at the initial hearing, the 
interest in proceedings must be "one of some advantage or disadvantage, such as that 
arising from a right in property directly affected, and which is not remote. "30 He 
emphasised the point that an interest in seeking to enforce the public law as a matter of 
principle would not be sufficient.31 
This decision has been followed in subsequent cases, and the reasoning extended to 
appeals lodged against resource consent applications under s 120. In Paihia & District 
Citizens Association v The North land Regional Council,32 the T1ibunal considered 
whether a Maori woman who had not made a submission at the consent hearing had 
standing to appear on behalf of herself and her whanau. The Tribunal found that she 
did not have an interest greater than the public generally, despite the fact she had 
established that her whanau were recognised as being tangata whenua of Paihia for 
many generations.33 The Tribunal referred to Purification Technologies, stressing that 
it was not its desire to exclude people who wished to appear, but that it was bound by 
what Parliament had provided in the Act.34 
A similar question arose in Te Runanga O Te Taum£irere; Chelf wood Oysters & Co; N 
Harrington & Others v The North/and Regional Counci/35 which concerned a sewage 
28 (1980) 28 ALR 257. 
29 Above n 28, 270. 
30 Above n 27, 204. 
31 Above n 27, 204. 
32 A71/95. 
33 Above n 32, 2. 
34 Above n 32, 2. 
35 A81/95. 
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treatment proposal. In that case the Tribunal found that a local kaumatua did have 
standing because his interest in the local pipi beds as a traditional source of food was 
greater than that of the public generally.36 However it was held that the Te Ika a Maui 
Federation of Maori Aquaculturists Commercial and Traditional Fisherman Incorporated 
did not have standing. The Tribunal again made reference to the absence of an 
equivalent provision to s2(3) of the TCPA under the present legislation, and stated that 
"instances where the Tribunal might have been more liberal under past legislation where 
a request to join proceedings was not opposed, cannot alter that meaning, nor can 
decisions by the High Court to give standing to applicants for judicial review, to which 
section 274 does not apply" .37 The Tribunal did state, however, that Purification 
Technologies should not be taken as limiting standing to where an applicant was able to 
show the infringement of a property right.38 
Nevertheless, standing was again denied to public interest groups in Northland Port 
Corporation (NZ) Ltd v Whangarei District Council.39 That case concerned an 
application for a declaration under s313 of the RMA relating to proposals for 
reclamation and associated works at Marsden Point. Applying the test from Purification 
Technologies, the Tribunal found that the Stop CRA Pollution Group did not have a 
sufficient interest to participate in the declaration hearing. Nor did the Tribunal accord 
standing to the Forest and Bird Protection Society or the Whangarei Heads Citizens 
Association Incorporated. The Tribunal did suggest that an individual member of the 
latter association might have a sufficient interest as an owner of nearby property.40 The 
Tribunal stated again that it was not its wish that anyone who sought to participate 
should be declined the opportunity to make submissions. 
( b) Analysis of decisions 
This line of cases has been vigorously criticised by a number of commentators who 
argue that this interpretation of s 274 runs contrary to the aims of the legislative reform 
which were to increase public participation.41 As the High Court noted in Ports of 
Auckland v Auckland Regional Council,42 "the whole thrust of the Act favours 
interested parties to have an input into the decision making process".43 The focus on 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Above n 35, 5. 
Above n 35, 4. 
Above n 35, 4 . 
All 7/95 . 
Above n 39, 3. 
See for example, Kennelh ·Palmer "Standing before Lhe Planning Tribunal" (1995) 1 
Butterworths Resource Management Bulletin 143; Andrew Riddell "Standing problems continue 
under RMA" (1996) 1 Environmental Law Reporter 167. 
[1995) NZRMA 233. 
Above n 42, 239. 
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private property rights also has serious implications for Maori groups who traditionally 
operate on a communal interest basis. This problem can be seen in the Paihia & District 
Citizens case, although the Tribunal appears to have adopted a slightly broader 
approach in the Te Runanga O Taumarere case. 
An examination the reasoning of the Tribunal in Purification Technologies and 
subsequent cases suggests that an unnecessarily nan-ow interpretation has been 
adopted. First, it is difficult to understand the reliance of the Tribunal on the absence in 
the RMA of a provision equivalent to s 2(3) of the TCPA. That provision related to 
objection rights at the initial hearing stage, and not directly to standing rights at an 
appeal hearing. While it is true that there is no equivalent provision aimed specifically 
at public interest groups, the RMA confers the right to make a submission on a notified 
resource consent application on "any person".44 Thus the legislators would have seen 
no need to single out public interest groups. 
There may be more weight in the Tribunal's observation that where no right of 
intervention is accorded to third parties at the initial hearing it should be more hesitant to 
grant standing to persons or groups who are not pa11ies. However it is a little curious 
that the Tribunal should seek to apply the same reasoning to appeals against notified 
resource applications under s 120. In the Te Runanga O Taumarere case, the Tribunal 
is surely incon-ect in stating that "if Parliament had wished representative bodies to be 
entitled to take part in Tribunal proceedings it would have provided for them in 
language similar to that used in the 1977 Act. "45 In fact, the RMA confers equally 
comprehensive objection rights, and makes identical provision for standing ins 274. It 
might be assumed that in following the previous provision identically, Parliament 
intended that the same standing rules apply.46 The issue here is what the position ought 
to be where someone has not availed themselves of their objection rights at the initial 
hearing. In this respect the situation is no different to that which existed under the 
previous legislation. 
Secondly, the Tribunal takes an extremely conservative view on the authorities relating 
to standing. The decisions refen-ed to are mostly judicial review cases, and it is 
arguable that they are not relevant to the much more informal procedure of the Planning 
Tribunal. Kenneth Palmer notes that an appeal to the Planning Tribunal is not a strict 
legal action and cites the case of Wellington Club Inc v Carson that the process is 
"looking to solutions based :ipon inquiry rather than to decisions in favour of 
44 
45 
46 
RMA, s 96. 
Above n 35, 5. 
Palmer, above n 41, 144. 
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successful contestants". 47 Furthermore, as discussed in Part III D below, even in 
judicial review cases standing rules have been significantly relaxed since the case on 
which the Tribunal relied, Conservation Foundation, was decided. Recent Australian 
decisions on standing have also exhibited a more generous approach.48 It is interesting 
to contrast the Tribunal's reliance on judicial review cases in Purification Technologies 
with its statements in the later Te Runanga o Taumarere case that judicial review 
decisions cannot provide authority for wider standing requirements. It does not seem 
logical that judicial review cases be relied upon to restrict standing but not to broaden it. 
In fact, on the basis of Palmer's analysis, it might be possible to argue the converse, 
that there should not be a stricter standing requirement in the Tribunal than there is on 
review. 
Thirdly, s 5 of the RMA states that communities should be able to provide for their 
social, economic, and cultural wellbeing, and it has been suggested that this provision 
recognises that community interest groups have an interest greater than the public 
generally.49 Palmer argues further that the approach of the Planning Tribunal is 
inconsistent with s 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.50 That section 
provides that "every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural 
justice by any Tribunal... which has the power to make a determination in respect of that 
person's .. .interests protected or recognised by law". Palmer states that the interest of a 
bone fide environmental group in appearing on an appeal under the RMA must be an 
interest recognised by law and that this group would therefore have a right to be heard 
under s 27(1). He thus proposes that by virtue of s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, the 
ambiguity ins 274 should be construed so as to provide a wide standing requirement, 
thereby giving effect to the right of an environmental group to appear before the 
Tribunal. However the difficulty in his argument lies in identifying the interests of an 
environmental group as being a "person's .. .interests protected or recognised by law". 
The Acts Interpretation Act 1924 defines "person" to include an unincorporated body of 
persons which would bring an environmental group within s27(1). However s29 of 
the Bill of Rights Act states that except as otherwise provided, the provisions of the Act 
will apply "for the benefit of all legal persons as well as for the benefit of all natural 
persons". An incorporated environmental group would come within the definition of a 
legal person and therefore needs to identify the interest of that legal person. An 
unincorporated group on the other hand is a collection of natural persons, each of 
47 
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50 
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whom may have an interest. In either case, the key question is whether the interest is 
one protected or recognised by law. As noted above, it can be argued that s 5 of the 
RMA recognises the particular interest of the community in protecting the environment. 
Thus a community environmental group might be able to show an interest recognised 
by law and thereby bring itself within s 27(1). However there is nothing in the statute 
which would recognise the interest of an environmental group which was not 
community based. It appears, therefore, that Palmer's argument might be successful, 
but only in respect of community environmental groups. 
( c) Recent developments in the law 
It should be noted that Parliament has responded to the difficulties raised in the 
Purification Technologies line of cases. Clause 46 of the recently enacted Resource 
Management Amendment Act (No 4) modifies s 274 of the RMA to extend standing to 
"any person representing some relevant aspect of the public interest". Two points can 
be noted in respect of this amendment. First, while the amendment will eliminate a 
substantial number of the problems presently being expe1ienced in relation to s 274, it 
does not address the key problem of the Tribunal taking an unnecessarily restrictive 
approach to standing. The preceding analysis suggests that the real problem with earlier 
decisions on standing lay not with the legislation itself but with the restrictive approach 
given to it by the Tribunal. 
Secondly, it is interesting to note that the amendment has sparked some revival of the 
debate as to whether any formal requirement is necessary at all. During the reform 
process, commentators such as Palmer advocated the abolition of standing 
requirements.5 1 Andrew Riddell has reopened the debate, arguing that the amendment 
does not go far enough to extend standing. He suggests that formal standing 
requirements may be unnecessary in the light of the Tribunal's powers to impose costs 
awards under s 285, to limit addresses by parties having the same interests under s 
267(1)(h), and generally to regulate its own proceedings under s 269.52 While 
Parliament has again chosen not to follow this approach, it is to be hoped that the 
Tribunal will take a more generous approach to the provision as amended. In this way, 
effect would be given to the public participation objectives of the resource management 
reform and the role it envisaged for the Planning T1ibunal as an infonnal body 
unconstrained by needless technicalities. 
51 
52 
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B Appeal to the High Court on a point of law 
1 Scope of the Appeal 
While the Planning Tribunal undoubtedly has the expertise to deal with the bulk of 
resource management appeals, it cannot be expected to deal on its own with difficult 
legal issues. The Legislation Advisory Committee noted that appeal from the decision 
of a tribunal provides further protection of the rights of the individual litigant as well 
safeguarding the public interest in ensuring that the law is being faithfully and correctly 
enforced.53 The _Committee stated also that appeal serves another important public 
purpose in the clarification and development of the law.54 In a similar vein, the Franks 
Committee found that appeal from the decision of tribunals was important if decisions 
were to show a reasonable consistency.55 In recognition of these principles, the RMA 
carries through from the TCPA, the right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law. 
However, as the following discussion of the case law will demonstrate, the Court has 
shown some reluctance in exercising this role. 
The right of appeal is conferred on any party to proceedings in the Planning Tribunal by 
s 299 of the Act. That section provides that the appeal will be conducted in accordance 
with the High Court Rules except to the extent that they are inconsistent with ss 300 to 
397 of the Act. R701 provides in turn that the Rules apply subject to any specific 
provision in the Act conferring the right of appeal. In Environment Defence Society Inc 
v Mangonui County Council,56 the Court found that the former HCRR684 and 693 
were not applicable in the light of the specific statutory provisions of the TCP A 
However in Countdown Properties (Northlands Ltd) v Dunedin City Council57 the 
Court stated in respect of ss 300 to 307 that "in our view, it is unfortunate that such 
detailed matters of procedure are fixed by Statute".58 They noted that statutes are more 
difficult to amend than Rules of the Court, that most statutes leave procedural matters to 
the Rules once the right to appeal is conferred, and that it is desirable that the same rules 
should apply for similar kinds of appeal.59 The Comt recommended amendment to 
RMA to reduce the procedural detail in ss 300 to 307. 
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Appeal on a point of law is of a more limited nature than a general appeal. It focuses on 
correcting errors of law and on keeping inferior courts and tribunals in touch with the 
general principles of law, legality and natural justice. 60 Thus in contrast with appeal to 
the Planning Tribunal as discussed above, the role of the High Court under s 299 is 
extremely limited. While many disputes under the Act involve disagreement on the 
facts of the case, the High Court has no general appellate jurisdiction on questions of 
fact. Kenneth Palmer suggests that the rationale for this system is that the Planning 
Tribunal "is conceived to act as a expert jury on matters of fact and policy, and 
questions of reasonableness and the public interest as far as relevant to the planning 
powers". 61 This position is confirmed by the statement of the Legislation Advisory 
Committee that review of expert tribunals should be limited to questions of law.62 
There has, however, been some debate as to the scope of appeal under s 299, and as to 
the distinction between fact and law. 
( a) The decisio11 i11 Cou11tdown Properties 
The leading decision on the scope of review under s 299 is the Countdown Properties 
case in which the Court stated that:63 
this Court will intervene with decisions of the Tribunal only if it considers that the 
Tribunal: 
applied a wrong legal test; or 
came to a conclusion without evidence or one to which, on evidence, it could not 
have reasonably come; or 
took into account matters which it should not have taken into account; or 
• failed to take into account matters which it should have taken into account 
[emphasis added] 
This test has been applied in many subsequent cases, and has particularly strong 
precedent value because it was decided by a Full Court of three Judges. It is not clear 
whether this passage was intended to be an exclusive definition. However the 
statement that the Court will intervene only in the specified circumstances would 
suggest that it was intended to be an exclusive definition, and it has been treated as such 
in subsequent decisions. 
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( b) The distinction between law and fact 
While the first "ground" of intervention does not require the Court to examine the facts 
of the case, the remaining three "grounds" may require some examination of the facts. 
The Court has been anxious to limit the scope of this examination and has emphasised 
the distinction between questions of law and fact. Thus while it is well established that 
failure to consider relevant consideration gives rise to a question of law, the Court has 
found that once evidence is before the Tribunal, the weight to be given to it is within the 
Tribunal's discretion. 64 
In Manukau City v Trustees of Mangere Lawn Cemetery, 65 the Court emphasised that 
the distinction between law and fact would be blurred if it were to consider whether the 
Tribunal had reached the correct conclusion on the facts .66 In New Zealand Rail Ltd v 
Marlborough District Council,67 the Court stated that it was a question of fact and not 
law whether the Tribunal was correct in reaching the conclusion that the evidence was 
not sufficient to justify refusing the application on economic grounds. 68 Similarly in 
Moriarty v North Shore City Council, 69 the Court said that consideration of the weight 
given to the evidence would lead to the appeal turning into a general appeal and not the 
type of appeal provided and allowed for by the Act.70 
The repeated references to this point arise from the fact that appellants frequently invite 
the Court to consider questions of fact. In BP Oil New Zealand Ltd v Waitakere City 
Council,71 it was noted that "as is becoming increasingly common in cases of this kind, 
several of the questions are not questions of law, but matters of fact which the appellant 
seeks to overturn. "72 This reflects the nature of environmental disputes and the fact that 
the decision maker often hears competing evidence. The Courts have stated 
emphatically that preferring the evidence of one planner over that of other planners is a 
judgment on the facts and does not give rise to a question of law.73 
There does however remain the possibility of the Court overturning a decision on the 
basis that there was no evidence, or that the conclusion was one which was not 
"reasonable" on the evidence. The nature of the test for "reasonableness" is not entirely 
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clear from the case law. In Moriarty, Morris J stated that his task was to assess 
"whether the Tribunal has acted reasonably".74 By contrast, in the Mangere Lawn 
Cemetery reference was made to "Wednesbury" unreasonableness in the sense of a 
decision no Tribunal could reasonably reach.75 
It is clear, however, that the Court will be reluctant to intervene on the basis of 
insufficient or no evidence. In the Countdown case the Court noted that although it was 
possible in an appropriate case for the Court to find no evidence to justify a finding of 
fact, "it should be very loath to do so after the Tribunal's exhaustive hearing".76 
Furthermore, the Court has said that it may not intervene even where it does not find 
any evidence to support the decision. In an oft-quoted passage from Environmental 
Defence Society Inc and Tai Tokerau District Maori Council v Mangonui County 
Council, 77 Chilwell J stated that: 78 
An expert tribunal, such as the Planning Tribunal, ought to be given some latitude to 
reach findings of fact which fall within the area of it.s own expertise even in the absence of 
evidence to support such.findings; and some latitude in reaching findings of fact made in 
reliance upon its own expertise in the evaluation of conflicting evidence; and some 
latitude in reaching conclusions based on it.s expertise, without relating them or being 
able to relate them to specific findings of fact...[emphasis added) 
The Court went on to say that the quality of the evidence on which it made its decision 
was also for the Tribunal to decide, 79 but did add the proviso that "care should be 
taken to ensure that expertise is not used as a substitute for evidence such that the 
burden of proof is unfairly shifted." 80 
It is interesting to contrast this position with decisions of the United Kingdom courts 
under the Town and Country Planning Act 197l(UK). In a number of these cases the 
courts have overturned decisions on the basis that there was no evidence to warrant a 
finding of fact. However the courts have also been willing to examine the adequacy of 
the evidence, and in some cases has quashed a decision on the grounds that no 
reasonable decision maker could come to such a conclusion on the evidence.81 A 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Above n 69, 437. 
Above n 65, 60. 
Above n 57, 175. 
(1987) 12 NZTPA 349. 
Above n 77, 353. 
Above n 77, 366. 
Above n 77, 353. 
See Paul Walker "Irrationality and Proportionality" in M Supperstone and J Goudie (eds) Judicial 
Review (Butterworths, London, 1992). 
18 
distinction can be drawn between the New Zealand and United Kingdom positions by 
reference to the fact that in the United Kingdom the appeal under s 246 is generally 
against the decision of a planning inspector. Under the RMA, by contrast, the right to 
appeal lies against the decision of a judicial body. However it should be noted that in 
deferring to the decisions of the Planning Tribunal, the High Court of New Zealand has 
made reference not to the judicial nature of proceedings but to the expertise of the 
Tribunal. Thus the distinction outlined does not fully explain the cautiousness of the 
New Zealand Court. 
By contrast with the UK planning legislation, the RMA specifies in ss 104 and 105 the 
considerations which the consent authority must take into account. The question as to 
whether the precedent effect of a decision is a material consideration provides a useful 
illustration of this point. In the UK the courts have had to develop their own approach 
to the merits of consistency over individual justice.82 In New Zealand, s 104 of the 
RMA requires the decision maker to have regard to any district or regional plan. The 
High Court has been able to point to this provision in finding that precedent effect on 
the integrity of the plan is a material consideration. 83 
( c) Application of a wrong legal test 
The first "ground" of intervention enunciated in the Countdown case requires the Court 
to assess whether the Tribunal has applied the correct legal test. This would appear to 
be the type of issue that the Court was ideally suited to resolving. However on this 
ground also the Court has assigned itself a surprisingly limited role. It has shown a 
marked deference to decisions of the Tribunal, stating, for example, in Royal Forest 
and Bird Society v WA Habgood84 that although it was not bound by decisions of the 
Tribunal, "it would normally give great weight to interpretations by that Tribunal".85 In 
Stark, the Court held that it was for the Planning Tribunal to decide whether a policy of 
restricting urban sprawl was consistent with the purposes and principles of the Act. 86 
In New 'Zealand Rail the appellants alleged that the Tribunal had incon-ectly applied Part 
II of the RMA which contains the purpose and principles of the Act. Grieg J stated that 
this Part of the Act did not lend itself to strict rules and principles of statutory 
interpretation but was intended to allow the application of policy in a broad and general 
way. He explained that "it is for this purpose that the Planning Tribunal, with special 
8 2 See discussion in de Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5 ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995), para 22-024. 
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expertise and skill, is established and appointed to oversee and to promote the 
objectives and the policies and the principles under the Act". 87 
20 
The High Court has also effectively declined to express its views on costs awards under 
the Act. Under s 285 the Tribunal has a discretion to award such costs as it considers 
reasonable against any party. In Hunt v Auckland City Councii, 88 the Court heard an 
appeal from an award of costs against objectors who had brought proceedings in order 
to test the validity of a resource consent. They were successful on the procedural aspect 
of their claim but not on the substantive aspect. Williams J noted that the Tribunal had 
applied the principle established in Morton v Douglas Homes Ltd (No2).89 In that case 
it was held that the purpose of a costs award is to impose on an unsuccessful party an 
obligation to make a reasonable contribution towards the costs reasonably incurred by 
the successful party. Williams J found that the Tribunal's award of costs could not 
therefore be said to have been based on any wrong legal test. However given the 
current debate on the topic,90 it seems unfortunate that the Court did not take this 
opportunity to discuss the issue of costs awards against public interest litigants. Instead 
it held that the matter was largely a question for the Tribunal's discretion under s 285.91 
On the other hand it should be noted that, despite its reservations, the Court in Habgood 
did overturn the Tribunal's interpretation of "Maori ancestral land" ins 3(1)(g) of the 
TCPA. Similarly, in Shell New Zealand Ltd v Auckland City Council92 the Court 
overturned the Tribunal's interpretation of the inter-relationship betweens 7(c) in Part II 
of the Act, and s 105(2)(b)(i) which deals with the granting of resource consents. It is 
not entirely clear how the more interventionist approach in these cases can be reconciled 
with the rather restrictive approach of the cases outlined in the above paragraphs. 
However it appears that the Court may be more willing to intervene in cases such as 
Habgood, where the question of law involves interpretation of a specific phrase, rather 
than in cases like New 'Zealand Rail where consideration of the more general purpose 
and principles of the Act is required. 
While it is unclear how the different cases can be reconciled, the Court appears to be 
demonstrating a considerable degree of deference to the expertise of the Planning 
Tribunal. This may be appropriate where the consideration of factual evidence is 
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concerned, however there is less reason to defer to the Tribunal's decisions when a 
question of law is at issue. The right of appeal to the High Court is provided on the 
assumption that the higher Court is better able to determine the correct legal principles in 
a given case. One area in which the Tribunal has shown its limitations is in the 
interpretation of s 8 of the Act which requires that decision makers take into account the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Treaty jurisprudence is complex and the exact 
nature of its principles are uncertain. The Tribunal has handed down a number of 
contradictory decisions relating to whether a duty of consultation is imposed by s 8. It 
can be argued that a decision from the higher courts, who are better versed in Treaty 
issues, is required before a coherent approach to the consultation question can be 
established. 93 
Admittedly, Treaty issues are fairly specialised, and these criticisms may not be broadly 
applicable. David Williams has suggested that reliance on the superior appellate courts 
to determine resource management policy and the legislative intent of the Act may be 
misplaced. On the other hand, Sir Geoffrey Palmer has also noted the difficulties in 
interpreting Part II of the Act, and has suggested that the solution lies in waiting for a 
decision from the Court of Appeal to determine a "suitably progressive yet workable 
approach the Act" _94 It is submitted that it would be desirable for the Court to take a 
more active role in establishing the legal tests to be applied under the Act. 
( d) Procedural unfairness 
It is unclear to what extent the Court will intervene on the basis that the Tribunal has 
failed to act in a manner which is procedurally fair. While the test laid down in 
Countdown Properties makes no reference to procedural fairness, the RMA itself makes 
considerable provision for public input into decisions made under the Act. Thus any 
failure to comply with these provisions could be challenged on the ground of a failure to 
apply the correct legal test. It is interesting to note that the Countdown Properties case 
itself involved claims of procedural unfairness. The case concerned objections to a 
proposed change to a district plan. It was argued that the principles of natural justice 
required the Council to have prepared its report on the proposed change before the 
public hearing, so that objectors would have the chance to comment on it. The Court 
found that there was no merit in this submission. There had been a public hearing in 
accordance with s 39 of the Act, and appropriate and fair procedures had been observed 
as required by that section.95 The Court also found that any defect in the procedure or 
93 For further discussion of this poinl see an earlier paper of this wriler "Consullalion with Tangala 
Wbenua under the Resource Managemenl Acl 1991" Unpublished paper submitted for 
LLB(Hons) legal writing requirement, VUW, 1 September 1995. 
94 Sir Geoffrey Palmer Environment - The International Challenge (VUP, Wellington, 1995) 173. 
95 Above n 57, 162. 
substance of the original decision would be cured by the extensive hearing before the 
Planning Tribunal.96 However it is interesting that despite its earlier exclusion of 
procedural unfairness from the grounds of intervention, the Court did not immediately 
dismiss the appellants' arguments on this ground. 
2 Remedies available 
22 
It should be noted that the Court will not necessarily set aside a decision even where a 
mistake of law is established. In Habgood, the Court found that it was not compelled 
to quash the decision or refer it back where an error of law was established. Holland J 
stated that "common sense leads one to hope that before an appeal is allowed on a 
question of law the Court must be satisfied that any error of law which it finds to have 
occurred is one which has materially affected the judgment" .97 Thus the Court found 
that although the Tribunal had incorrectly interpreted s 3(l)(g) of the TCP A, it was 
satisfied that consideration of the evidence and submissions under that section would 
have made no difference to the decision.98 Similarly, in Manos v Waitakere City 
Council,99 the High Court found that although an irrelevant consideration had been 
taken into account this would not have affected the final outcome of the decision and so 
declined to grant the appeal. 100 In Habgood, the Court stated that it was a question of 
law whether the error was material to the decision and that the decision must be quashed 
unless it could be established beyond doubt that it did not materially affect the 
decision. 101 However the Court of Appeal in Manos 102 reached a contrary conclusion 
with respect to the standard of proof. 103 
In Countdown Properties the Court discussed the correct approach to be taken to relief 
when an error is determined to be material. Under R 718A of the High Court Rules, the 
Court has the power to substitute its own decision for that of the tribunal or person 
appealed from. However the Court in this case cited with approval the statement of 
Tipping Jin Port Otago Limited v Dunedin City Council 104 that it would be unusual in 
an appeal on a point of law for the Court to substitute its own conclusions on the factual 
matters underlying the point of law for the that of the Tribunal. The Com1 agreed "that 
unless the correctly legal approach could lead to only one substitute result, the proper 
96 
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course is to remit the matter back to the Tribunal as R718A(2) of the High Court Rules 
empowers". 105 
C Appeal to the Court of Appeal 
Appeal to the Court of Appeal is available under s 308 of the RMA which provides that 
s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act applies in respect of a decision of the High 
Court under s 299 of the RMA as if the decision had been made under s 107 of the 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957. The circumstances in which leave to appeal will be 
granted under s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act were recently considered in the 
cases of Shell New Zealand Ltd v Auckland City Council 106 and Manos v Waitakere 
City Council. 107 In Shell, the Court of Appeal noted that s 144(2) of the Summary 
Proceedings Act provides that the High Court may grant leave "if in the opinion of that 
Court the question of law involved in the appeal is one which by reason of its general or 
public importance or for any other reason ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal 
for decision". 
The appeal in the Shell case concerned an application for a resource consent to construct 
a service station. The application had been refused by the consent authority and the 
appeal to the Planning Tribunal was equally unsuccessful. In the High Court, Temm J 
found that the Tribunal had misinterpreted the phrase "maintenance and enhancement of 
amenity" ins 7(c) of the RMA, but found that this was a general statement, and not 
material to the decision. In the Court of Appeal the appellant alleged that the Judge had 
erred in so describing the Tribunal's misinterpretation. The Court of Appeal found that 
this was not a question of law satisfying the criteria under s 144. 108 Richardson P 
stated that at most the appellants allegation "is an argument that the Judge incorrectly 
interpreted the Tribunal's application of the relevant law to the facts. The Judge's 
conclusion in that regard ... involved an analysis of the Tribunal's assessment of the 
facts and its conclusions from the facts .. .It did not require determination of any 
significant legal questions" .109 
In Manos, the High Court judge similarly found that the Tribunal had made an error of 
law but determined that as the errors were not material the matter should not be remitted 
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to the Tribunal for a rehearing. Counsel for the appellant submitted that there was a 
possibility that there would be a different decision upon reconsideration by the 
Tribunal. He argued that the appeal should be ente1tained under the "any other reason" 
limb of s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act in order to avoid a sense of injustice 
arising from the decision to refuse a rehearing despite the fact that numerous errors of 
law had been committed. The appellants were entitled to have their application 
considered on the correct legal basis. Counsel also stressed the need for the Court to 
oversee the transition from the former Town and Country Planning approach to the 
"new and very different" Resource Management approach. 
The Court of Appeal stated that it was satisfied that the refusal of an application for a 
resource consent is not appropriate for a second appeal "unless it is likely to have an 
impact going beyond the particular case" .110 The Court then discussed the test to be 
applied in assessing whether an error is material, stating that " we do not accept that 
some higher test such as satisfaction as to immateriality beyond reasonable doubt to be 
required. The test as to immateriality is one of judgment rather than proof to a 
standard". 111 Thus the Court found that the judge had applied the correct test and so 
refused leave to appeal against his decision. This judgment would appear to overrule 
the earlier decision of the High Court in Habgood. As noted above, it was held in that 
case that a decision must be quashed or referred back unless it was established "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" that the error was not material to the decision. Surprisingly 
however, this decision was not referred to by the Court of Appeal in Manos. Nor did 
the Court address the issue of its role in developing the correct approach to the new 
regime established by the RMA. 
l 1 O Above n 102, 148. 
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D Judicial Review 
Like appeal, judicial review also serves an important function in ensuring that the law is 
correctly and faithfully applied. However unlike a general appeal, it is not concerned 
with reviewing the merits of a decision, but looks rather to the manner in which those 
decisions are made. In the context of the RMA, it appears that not much consideration 
was given to the role of judicial review. An examination of the Resource Management 
Law Reform working papers shows considerable concern as to the role of appeal, but 
very few references to the role of review. The working papers make reference to 
judicial review in the context of enforcement provisions 112 but not with respect to the 
consent process. Kenneth Palmer notes that the function of the Tribunal on appeal may 
take on elements of judicial review but does not address the role of review itself. 113 
This part of the paper discusses the potential for judicial review of the resource consent 
process, and examines the role it has already played. 
1 Availability of review where there exists a right of appeal 
(a) Review of a consent authority's decision 
(i) Application for review where appeal right not exercised 
Prior to 1977, when the new Town and Country Planning Act was introduced, there 
was no restriction on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to hear applications for 
judicial review. However s 166 of the 1977 Act provided that review would not lie 
until any right of appeal to the Planning Tribunal had been exhausted. In his review of 
that Act, Anthony Heam noted that this provision had been included "perhaps because 
of the specialist nature of the role of the Tribunal" .114 The restriction on review 
contained ins 166 of the earlier act appears to have been canied through into s 296 of 
the RMA without much comment. The provision has been described not as a complete 
ouster of the Court's jurisdiction, but a postponement until the decision has been 
reviewed by the Planning Tribunal on appeal. However there has been some debate on 
the extent to which the provision precludes review. While there has not been any recent 
case law discussing the effect of s 296, guidance can been sought from earlier decisions 
involving s 166 of the TCPA. 
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The leading case on the interpretation of s 166 of the TCPA is Love and Robson v 
Porirua City Council. 115 That case concerned a proposal by the Porirua City Council to 
put three tennis courts on part of a public reserve. At the hearing of its own application, 
the Council passed a resolution on the casting vote of the Chair authorising the 
construction of two tennis courts. Mr and Mrs Love, who had been unsuccessful 
objectors, lodged an appeal to the Planning Tribunal. However, before the appeal was 
heard, they also made an application for judicial review to the High Court on the 
grounds that first, the use of the casting vote was unlawful and secondly, that there was 
a breach of natural justice for reasons of bias. A similar application was made by Mrs 
Robson who had not made an objection at the initial hearing and did not therefore have 
a right to appeal. The judicial review proceedings were moved by consent to the Court 
of Appeal. 
The Council rejected the applicants' contentions, but also argued that by virtue of s 166, 
the application should be struck out on jurisdictional grounds. In response, the 
applicants cited a number of cases in support of the proposition that, as a result of the 
alleged breach, the decision of the council was a nullity and legally ineffective for the 
purpose of founding an appeal. 116 In essence the applicants were advocating that the 
Court adopt an approach sometimes described as "the absolute theory of invalidity" .117 
However, the Court of Appeal, applying some recent English authorities found that the 
cases cited by the applicants were wrongly decided. The Court referred to the decision 
of the Privy Council in Calvin v Carr118 in which it was held that a decision made 
contrary to natural justice might be void, but that until it was so declared by the Court it 
might continue to have some effect or existence in law. 119 The Court noted that this 
approach had already been adopted in New Zealand in the case of Al Burr Ltd v 
Blenheim Borough Council. 120 In that case it was held that except in rare cases of 
"flagrant invalidity" a decision that is alleged to be defective will be recognised as 
operative unless set aside.121 
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This approach has been subsequently approved in a number of cases. In Golden Bay 
Cement Company Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 122 the Court of Appeal cited 
Love and held that an appeal would lie against a purported decision of the 
Commissioner because such a decision was valid until determined otherwise by the 
Court. 123 The decision in Love was also cited in Martin v Ryan 124 in which it was 
noted that the demise of the absolute theory of invalidity was now complete in New 
Zealand. 125 However the Court also considered when an example of "flagrant 
invalidity" might arise. Fisher J stated that "to be iITevocably void ab initio, one would 
have to be able to confidently postulate at the time of the purported decision that the 
defects were so fundamental that regardless of such subsequent events, no Court acting 
according to recognised legal principles could ever in the exercise of its discretion 
withhold a remedy". 126 
Fisher J also suggested that the effectiveness of a privative clause "would seem to turn 
upon inferred statutory intention as it applies to each case, rather than any conceptual 
differences between 'flagrant' and 'non-flagrant' categories" .127 This is consistent 
with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bulk Gas User's Group v Attorney-
General128 in which it was held that it would be a question of statutory interpretation as 
to whether Parliament had intended to empower an administrative tribunal to determine 
conclusively a question of law. 129 In the context of the s 296 of the RMA, 
Parliament's intention appears to be that any problem with the decision of the consent 
authority should be dealt with initially by the Planning Tribunal. This approach would 
rule out almost any challenge by way of judicial review where there lies an unexercised 
appeal right against the decision. 
It is interesting to note that in Love v Porirua City Council, the Court declined not only 
that the application of Mr and Mrs Love, but also that of Mrs Robson. Although she 
herself did not have a right to appeal, the Com1 noted that she had the right under s 
15713o of the TCPA to join in an appeal lodged by Mr and Mrs Love. It was said that 
until this right was exhausted "the judicial review application should as a matter of 
common sense and for reasons of fairness to any parties to an appeal be held in 
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abeyance or as a matter of discretion [be] struck out as premature". 131 Thus it would 
appear that where one party has an appeal right, other parties will also be barred from 
seeking judicial review of the same matter. It might be questioned whether the same 
reasoning should apply where the other party is denied standing on the appeal. As 
noted in Part III A of this paper, the Planning Tribunal has shown a marked reluctance 
in granting standing to persons who are not party to the appeal. It is thus conceivable 
that a person in the position of Mrs Robson could have her application for review 
declined, and then be denied the right to appear before the Tribunal. In this situation, it 
might be argued that there had been a breach of her right to natural justice under s 27(1) 
of the Bill of Rights. 
(ii) Application for review once the appeal right has been exercised 
It appears from the preceding analysis that review will not lie until the Planning 
Tribunal has heard an appeal on the matter. However it is less clear what the position is 
once the appeal right has been exercised. The question which arises is whether the 
applicant is entitled to have her case reheard by the original decision maker or whether 
the defects in the original decision are "cured" by the appeal hearing. This question has 
been discussed in a number of cases. In Love it was held that the appeal hearing would 
cure any defect in the original process. The Court in that case cited the decision in 
Wellington Club Inc v Carson 132 in support of the proposition that "the appeal itself 
will enable a complete rehearing de novo, in the course of which any suggestion of 
earlier defect or error can be examined and where necessary corrected" .133 However it 
should be noted that while the Court in Carson expressed the view that the jurisdiction 
of the Planning Tribunal was original and not appellate, it did not make specific mention 
of its ability to cure defects in the original decision. Furthermore, the Court appears to 
have over-looked considerable authority to the contrary view. 
In Reid v Rowley134 the Court of Appeal held that an appeal does not normally cure a 
breach in natural justice in the original hearing so as to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Courts to redress breaches of natural justice. 135 Cooke J expressed the view that the 
powers of the Planning Appeals Board would come within this category of "normal" 
cases. This dicta had been subsequently applied in the planning case of Anderton v 
Auckland City Council136 despite the invitation of counsel to disregard it as obiter. 
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Mahon J added that he preferred the view that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was 
appellate and not original. 
Furthermore, in Calvin v Carr itself it was stated that planning decisions were a typical 
case in which the complainant has a right to "nothing less than a fair hearing at both the 
original and appeal stage". 137 The Privy Council in that case did note that it was not 
possible to lay down a general rule on the question as to whether a defect could be 
cured by a rehearing, noting that there were a wide range of situations and rules for 
which this question would arise. 138 Again it should also be noted that there is a 
difference between the planning appeals systems in New Zealand and the UK. Thus it 
might be argued that the fact the Tribunal hears an appeal de novo makes it more likely 
that a defect in the original decision will be cured. 
In New Zealand, the most recent discussion of this issue was in Countdown Properties 
which concerned with the jurisdiction of the High Court on an appeal from the Planning 
Tribunal. The Court referred to the decisions in Love, Calvin v Carr, and Burr and 
found that this was a case in which any defects at the council hearing were cured by the 
thorough hearing by the Planning Tribunal. 139 The Court does however appear to 
acknowledge that, consistently with Calvin v Carr, there may be instances where a 
defect would not be not be cured. This would be consistent with the earlier decision in 
Anderton. However it should be noted that Anderton was decided under the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1953 which did not contain a provision equivalent to s 166 of the 
TCP A 1977 or s 296 of the RMA. 
Thus it can be seen that the case law, both in New Zealand and in other jurisdictions, 
does not to lay down a clear rule as to whether an appeal can cure a defect in the original 
decision. 140 However in the context of the RMA it would seem illogical for the 
Tribunal to remake a decision and then have it referred back to the consent authority for 
a rehearing. In this respect it is significant that the Tribunal hears the case in its entirety 
and effectively remakes the whole decision. On the other hand, it is important that 
consent authorities be required to observe the principles of natural justice. A specific 
finding of the Court on review would bring this point home more explicitly. However 
it is submitted that the factors in favour of allowing review are outweighed by those 
suggesting that it should not be allowed. 
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( b) Review of a Planning Tribunal decision 
Another possibility is that review might be sought of the decision of the Planning 
Tribunal. While there is no provision in the RMA restricting judicial review at this 
stage, there does exist a right of appeal on a point of law against any decision of the 
Tribunal on a resource consent application. Where there is such a right of appeal, the 
situation is complicated by the fact the Court may in its discretion refuse relief if other 
remedies have not been exhausted. The British Law Commission has recently endorsed 
this proposition, stating that in its view it is important that judicial review "be seen as a 
residual jurisdiction and, save in exceptional circumstances, not one to be invoked 
where there is an alternative remedy". 141 The Commission notes that there is a need to 
identify the scope of the rule, 142 and suggests that the adequacy of the alternative 
remedy should define the scope of the principle. 143 It suggests that a legal alternative 
remedy should be regarded as an adequate alternative remedy, 144 and that where such a 
remedy exists, an application for review should not proceed to a substantive hearing 
unless the applicant can show that judicial review is nevertheless the appropriate 
remedy. 145 In relation to this final point, the Commission noted that a number of 
consultees had expressed concern that the applicant be entitled to apply for judicial 
review both of the appeal and of any matters involved in the original decision which 
were not adequately remedied by the appeal. 146 
It does not appear that an attempt has yet been made to review a decision of the 
Planning Tribunal where there exists the right of appeal under s 299. If the 
Commission's recommendations are adopted in New Zealand, then this would appear 
to exclude the possibility of judicial review of Planning Tribunal decisions in favour of 
appeal to the High Court under s 299 of the RMA. However, other commentators have 
argued that the courts should not require other remedies to be exhausted before relief is 
granted by way of judicial review. 
Lord Bingham has noted that there have been few cases where relief has been denied on 
the basis of an alternate remedy being available, and has expressed satisfaction that this 
should be so, saying that "It would seem to me on the whole desirable that when 
unlawful conduct is proved before a court of justice, it should generally be willing to 
say so and grant relief, whether an equally convenient, beneficial and effectual 
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alternative remedy exist or not" .147 Timothy Pitt-Payne argues that the theoretical basis 
for review is that it performs a different function to appeal; that judicial review is 
concerned with the legality of the decision, and not its merits. 148 He notes that in 
"exceptional circumstances" 149 the courts will entertain applications for review even 
where alternate remedies have not been exhausted. He suggests that the availability of 
review will depend on the facts of the case, and cites a number of cases in which it was 
held that review would lie despite the existence of an appeal. 
The cases cited by Pitt-Payne are those in which the right to appeal would be 
useless, 150 or where review would be quicker, cheaper and more efficient.151 
However these arguments may be less persuasive in a context such as the RMA where 
the appeal available is appeal on a point of law. In this situation it is more difficult to 
distinguish the function of the court on appeal and review. De Smith suggests that any 
ground of challenge available under a judicial review action is now available also for an 
appeal on a point of law. 152 However, as will be discussed in more detail in Part IV of 
this paper, some differences between appeal under s 299 of the RMA and judicial 
review of decisions can be detected. In particular, it is not clear whether appeal will lie 
against the decision of the Planning Tribunal on the ground of procedural unfairness. It 
follows that if appeal is not available on this ground, then the Court should be willing to 
grant relief on an application for review. It is interesting also to note that in UK 
planning decisions, the courts have considered that in appropriate circumstances judicial 
review is not precluded by the statutory appeal process. 153 Thus a fairly strong 
argument can be made that in New Zealand also there may be circumstances in which a 
decision of the Planning Tribunal is open to review. 
2 Review where there is no right of appeal 
At this stage, the debate as to whether review will be available against an appealable 
decision, remains largely theoretical. However judicial review has been held to lie 
against the decision of a consent authority or the Planning Tribunal where there is no 
147 Sir Thomas Bingham "Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" [1991) Public Law 64, 
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right of appeal. Thus, for example, the Court has heard an application for review of the 
Planning Tribunal's decision to grant a discharge of an interim enforcement order. 154 
In respect of resource consent decisions, it has been noted above that a right of appeal 
lies against any decision of a local authority. However that right is only conferred on 
the applicant or any person who has made a submission on the application. While any 
person has the right to make a submission on a notified application, an interesting 
situation arises where an application is not notified. In these circumstances there is no 
right to make a submission, and therefore no right to appeal against the decision of the 
consent authority. 155 Instead, judicial review has been sought of the decision not to 
notify the application. Similarly, it has been indicated that an application for review 
may be the only approach available in relation to decisions to grant certificates of 
compliance.156 Again, a right of appeal against this decision is conferred only on the 
applicant. However, to date it is the non-notification decisions which have provided the 
largest body of judicial review decisions under the Act. 
The discretion not to notify applications is conferred by s 94 of the RMA. That section 
provides that an application for a discretionary or non-complying activity need not be 
notified if (a) the consent authority is satisfied that the effect on the environment will be 
minor, and (b) written approval has been obtained from every person whom the consent 
authority is satisfied may be adversely affected by the granting of the resource consent, 
unless the authority considers it is unreasonable in the circumstances to require the 
obtaining of every such approval. 157 It should first be noted that the discretion is 
phrased subjectively, that its exercise is dependent on the consent authority being 
"satisfied" that the preconditions in subsections (a) and (b) are satisfied. Furthermore, 
a determination that the effect on the environment is "minor" will require some degree 
of judgment rather than the application of a strict legal test. 
( a) Grounds of review 
The first case involving an application for review of a decision made under s 94 was 
Quarantine Waste Ltd v Waste Resources Ltd. 158 The Court noted that Act clearly 
confers a discretion on the consent authmity not to notify an application, and that it is 
not for the Court to substitute its own decision for that of the consent authority. 
Blanchard J stated that the role of the Comt is to dete1mine "whether proper procedures 
l 54 Ngati Rangatahi Whanaunga (Association) v The Planning Tribunal [1995] NZRMA 481. 
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were followed, whether all relevant and no irrelevant considerations were taken into 
account and whether the decision was reasonably made"_ 159 This seems to be a 
restatement of the three established grounds of judicial review of procedural 
impropriety, illegality and irrationality. 160 Subsequent cases have however tended to 
focus on illegality and irrationality as opposed to procedural impropriety. The only case 
to discuss procedural propriety was Carter v North Shore City Councif16l in which the 
applicants argued they had a legitimate expectation that the application would be 
notified. The Court found, however, that there could be no such expectation as the 
consent authority had specifically stated that it would reserve the right to notify or not 
notify the application. 162 In Worldwide Leisure Ltd v Symphony Group Ltd163 the 
Court made no mention of procedural propriety as a ground of review, citing a passage 
from Carter that the consent authority was required to "take into account all relevant 
matters and to act rationally and otherwise lawfully in connection with a decision to 
approve". 164 
By contrast, illegality has been raised as a ground of review in a number of cases. In 
Quarantine Waste, the applicants argued that the consent authority's decision was 
unlawful as it had failed to consult with tangata whenua as required by s 8 of the RMA. 
The Court noted that the consent authority was relying on the fact that the applicant had 
consulted extensively itself. While it expressed reservations about second hand 
consultation in general, it found that in this case the failure to consult did not result in 
the consent authority failing to take into account any relevant considerations. 165 As a 
result, the Court found that even if the authority itself did have a duty of consultation, 
the Court would exercise its discretion not to grant relief. 166 In Worldwide Leisure, the 
Court again stated that failure to consult with the tangata whenua would give rise to an 
allegation of failure to comply with the requirements of the RMA. 167 This failure was 
particularly important in this case as it was believed that the site of the proposed 
development might contain a spring sacred to the Ngati Rauhoto people. The Court 
granted Ngati Rauhoto's application for review and the consent authority's decision 
was quashed. 168 
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The question as to whether the consent authority had applied the correct legal test arose 
in Roydhouse v Hawkes Bay Regional Council. 169 The Court found that the authority 
was correct in assuming that an activity "lawfully established" could be an activity so 
established under previous planning law and was not limited to activities lawfully 
established under the RMA as the applicant argued. 170 However in Burton v Auckland 
City Council 171 the Court held that the consent authority had not applied the correct 
legal test in relation to an application to remove a large number of trees from a very 
steep slope. Blanchard J found that the consent authority should not have considered 
removal of the trees in isolation, but should have looked to the impact their removal 
would have on the stability of the slope. 172 In failing to do so, the authority had 
omitted to take into account a relevant factor. Thus the Court found that interim relief 
should be maintained against further removal of trees from the slope. 
It is on the grounds of unreasonableness that most applicants have sought to challenge 
non-notification decisions. However the Court's exercise of review on this ground has 
proved problematic. In a number of cases the applicant has alleged that a decision not 
to notify was unreasonable on the basis that there was evidence that the effects on the 
environment would be more than minor, or that there were persons who would be 
affected by the granting of the application. However the Court has noted that while the 
decision maker must take into account relevant considerations, the weight to be 
accorded to particular matters is for the consent authority to determine. 173 Similarly, 
the Court has found that where there is competing evidence, it cannot be said that the 
decision to prefer one set of evidence is unreasonable. 174 Nor is it necessarily 
unreasonable for an authority to make a decision contrary to the advice of its own 
planner.175 On the other hand, in Carter, the Court found that a consent authority's 
decision that only two people would be affected by a proposed development was not 
beyond challenge on the ground of unreasonableness. 176 It should be noted, however, 
as this conclusion was reached in relation to an application for a strike out order, it was 
not necessary for the Court to determine the matter conclusively. 
The nature of the Court's power on review for unreasonableness was discussed in the 
Worldwide Leisure case. Cartwright J noted that "the consent authority has a wide 
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discretion and except in circumstances which might amount to a decision made 
unreasonably or irrationally (in the public law sense of that term), the Court will be 
reluctant to intervene".177 She also stated that weight is usually only a ground for 
intervention if the decision maker has placed no weight on a relevant factor.178 She put 
forward the constitutional argument that as Parliament has entrusted decision making 
responsibility in this area to local authorities, the Court should not interfere by making 
its own decision on the merits. From a pragmatic perspective, the consent authority has 
the relevant expertise which the Court will not possess_ 179 However it should be noted 
that the law is presently unclear as to whether incorrect weight can invalidate a decision. 
It has been suggested in both New Zealand and Australian case law that weight may 
provide a basis for setting aside a decision, 180 but a recent decision of the Australian 
High Court states that the weight to be given to the material before the decision maker is 
for him or her to decide.181 
Cartwright J also cited the case of Puhlhofer v Hillingdon London Borough Councifl82 
in which it was held that review on a mistake of fact was limited to situations in which 
the decision maker was acting "perversely". She stressed that if this approach were not 
taken, and the Court were evaluate competing scientific evidence, then it would be 
looking into the merits of the application. 183 However, despite the dicta in Puhlhofer 
there have been cases in which the courts have applied a somewhat less restrictive test 
for intervention where there is an alleged mistake of fact. It is particularly interesting to 
note that in the United Kingdom the Court has set aside a number of planning decisions 
where the decision maker had made a material mistake of fact. 184 However it is unclear 
whether these decisions can be seen as support for the proposition that mistake of fact 
stands as a ground of review in its own right, or whether these decisions more properly 
come within the ground of unreasonableness. 185 In Secretary of State for Education 
and Science v Tameside MBC186 it was suggested that review could lie where the 
decision maker had acted upon an incorrect basis of fact. That case was referred to by 
Cooke Pin Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration 187 in which he held that the 
177 Above n 163, 181. 
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Minister's decision was invalid on the ground of mistake of fact as well as the ground 
of procedural unfaimess. 188 However in the later case of New 'Zealand Fishing 
Industry Association Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries 189 Cooke P appeared 
to limit mistake of fact to unreasonable mistake of fact, stating that "to jeopardise 
validity on the ground of mistake of fact the fact must be an established one or an 
established and recognised opinion; and that it cannot be said to be a mistake of fact to 
adopt one of two differing points of view of the facts, each of which may be reasonably 
held". 190 
(b) Standing 
The issue of standing is important to the scope of judicial review because in its absence, 
the court has no jurisdiction over the administrative action being challenged. 191 There 
has been some discussion of standing requirements in the non-notification decisions, 
with a particular focus on the standing rights of public interests litigants and trade 
competitors. However there appears to be some confusion concerning the test for 
standing in these cases. This may be due in part to the fact there is no statutory 
definition of standing requirements in New Zealand. The JAA is silent in this respect, 
and as a result standing rules have been developed through the common law. 
Traditionally different standing rules applied depending on which remedy was being 
sought. Thus on an application for a declaration or injunction the applicant would have 
had to show damage different in quality from or substantially greater than that of the 
public generally.192 On an application for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus different 
tests would be applied.193 
However the decision in Re Royal Commission on Thomas Case 194 suggests that the 
previous rules of standing for each prerogative writ were not imported into the JAA. 
Instead the courts have followed the decision of the House of Lords in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd, 195 
that except in exceptional circumstances, the courts should be able to review any serious 
breach of a public duty notwithstanding an applicant's alleged lack of standing. 196 In 
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Hallett v Attorney General197 the Court noted the development of a more liberal attitude 
to standing and stated that the Court should be reluctant to reject a claim on technical 
grounds where there were matters of genuine public interest warranting judicial 
examination. 198 An observation along the same lines was made recently in North 
Shore City Council v Waitemata Electric Power Board.199 
A similar liberalisation of standing rules has been noted in the United Kingdom. By 
contrast with the New Zealand position, RSC Order 53, rule 3 specifies a single test for 
standing of whether the applicant has a "sufficient interest" in the matter to which the 
application relates. A recent report of the British Law Commission considered the 
question of whether standing rules are necessary at all.200 A majority of those 
consulted by the Law Commission did not question the need to establish standing,201 
however concern was expressed that standing rules should not exclude public interest 
challenges. The Commission recommended that a "two-track" system of standing be 
adopted, in which the first track would cover people personally affected by the 
decision, and the second would be a discretionary track covering matters including 
public interest challenges.202 This position is consistent with recent English case law 
allowing public interest litigants standing.203 
In the context of non-notification decisions, standing rules take on a particular 
significance because the discretion which is being challenged relates itself to limits on 
public participation. A narrow approach to standing would mean that the decision 
maker's discretion would be incapable of scrutiny or challenge. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of a commercial developer seeking a non-notified consent, it is 
important that the function of the decision maker is not disrupted unnecessarily by 
expensive and lengthy litigation.204 
In Quarantine Waste, the Court cited with approval the Self-Employed case, noting that 
it would be important to consider questions of standing in the legal and factual context 
of each case, and that standing requires a sufficient interest in the matter to which the 
application relates.205 Blanchard J stated that a liberal approach should be taken to 
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standing where environmental concerns were at issue. However, in finding that a trade 
competitor would not have standing, he referred to the fact that a competitor would not 
be affected any more than the public generally. 206 Although he did not identify it as 
such, this appears to be a reference back to the test established in relation to objection 
rights under the Town and Country Planning Act 1953.207 Confusion arises because 
s94 uses very similar wording, requiring the written permission of any person 
"adversely affected". Thus it is not clear which test the Judge is referring to when he 
states that "whether or not the consent authority acting under s 94(2) is correct in 
thinking that the adverse effect on the environment will be minor, a challenge to its 
decision can be made only by someone who has been "affected" by the decision and has 
not given written approval. "208 It would appear that he cannot be referring to 
"adversely affected" ins 94(2)(b) because he later suggests that a public interest group 
would have standing to challenge the consent authority's decision, and such a group 
would not come within that subsection. This suggests that the Judge is again making 
reference to the earlier test for standing. 
The slight confusion apparent in Quarantine Waste was carried through into the decision 
of the Court in Worldwide Leisure. Cartwright J approved the observation in 
Quarantine Waste that a liberal approach should be taken to standing where 
environmental issues are at stake. She then referred to the test for standing under the 
TCPA of a person affected more than the public generally, and agreed with counsel's 
submission that this test was no longer relevant. She found that under the new 
statutory regime "the measure is the impact on each person or party". 209 In coming to 
this conclusion, she relied on the definition of "effect" ins 3 of the RMA, stating that 
"the very breadth of the definition contemplates that both persons who are directly 
affected and those on whom the immediate impact is less will have standing."210 
However this statement appears to confuse the definition of "effect" under the RMA 
with the test for standing. It is submitted that while the definition of "effect" in the Act 
is relevant to whether the consent authority has con-ectly exercised its discretion under 
s94, it should not be used as a means of determining the preliminary question of 
whether the applicant has standing. 
Apart from the conceptual distinction already discussed, there a.re also practical 
consequences of confusing the RMA definition of "affected" with the test for standing 
on a judicial review action. It is probably accurate to say that most applicants will be 
206 Above n 158, 536. 
207 Blencraft Manufacturing Co Ltd v Fletcher Development Co Ltd [1974) 1 NZLR 205. 
208 Above n 158, 535. 
209 Above n 163, 184. 
210 Above n 163, 183. 
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seeking review on the basis that they are persons "adversely affected by the granting of 
the application" whose written consent has not been obtained pursuant to s 94. In these 
cases it will make little practical difference if a court uses the same test for standing. 
However, De Smith points out that although the statute confeITing the discretion may 
expressly or impliedly identify certain people as having an interest in the subject matter 
of the application, there may be other "less obvious situations" where the applicant may 
have an interest in the matter.211 
The position of public interest groups is another important consideration. In Quarantine 
Waste the Court emphasised the need for public interest groups to have standing where 
environmental issues are at stake. However it is unclear how such a group would show 
that they were "affected" in the terms of the test laid down in that case, or in Worldwide 
Leisure. It is submitted that a clearer test similar to the English approach would be 
preferable. Given that the Self-Employed case has already been accepted as good law 
in New Zealand, this would not represent a departure from established precedent. The 
courts should also refrain from looking to tests for standing developed through the 
statutory appeal structure of the Planning Tribunal. This issue is of particular 
importance given the decision of the Planning Tribunal in Purification Technologies Ltd 
v Taupo District Counci/2 12 and subsequent cases in which it has been held that public 
interest groups do not have standing. 
Finally, the position of trade competitors deserves some consideration. Under previous 
planning legislation, it had been held that evidence of an adverse economic effect was 
sufficient to give a trade competitor standing.213 A business interest was generally held 
to be sufficient to show standing under the JAA.214 As a result, the planning process 
was often used as a means of blocking a competitor's application. 215 Not surprisingly, 
the drafters of the RMA sought to avoid this situation by providing in section 104(8) 
that "when considering an application for a resource consent, a consent authority shall 
not have regard to the effects of trade competition on trade competitors." Although this 
provision has proved largely ineffective in preventing trade wars under the Act itself,216 
the courts have used it to deny standing to trade competitors upon application for 
judicial review. 
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In Quarantine Waste it was held that adverse economic effect could not be used to 
differentiate the applicant from the public generally because this was not something a 
consent authority could consider when considering whether to grant a resource 
application under s 104.217 This is another example of the Court narrowing standing 
requirements by reference to the RMA. Again, it is true that a trade competitor would 
fail to satisfy the requirements of s 94(2)(b) and could not therefore argue that it were a 
person "adversely affected" in terms of that subsection. However the approach of the 
Court to standing would also rule out a trade competitor who sought review of a 
decision on the basis that the adverse effect on the environment would be more than 
minor in terms of s 94(2)(a). In the context of the RMA, arguments have been made in 
favour of allowing trade competitors to participate in a role of "public watchdog". 218 
However it has also been shown that they can act as a significant impediment to the 
process. 219 Subsequent cases have affirmed the approach of the Court in Quarantine 
Waste.220 While this could be seen as an implicit rejection of "public watchdog" type 
arguments, it is submitted that greater consideration be given to the desirability or 
otherwise of allowing trade competitors to intervene in this role. This position is 
supported by a recent statement of the Planning and Development Select Committee that 
"trade competitors must still be able, in the same way as any other person, to make 
submissions setting out legitimate environmental concerns".221 
A final point that can be noted in respect of standing under the Act is the availability of 
relator proceedings. This type of proceeding can be used by a person seeking to 
enforce a public interest. Under Rule 95 of the High Court Rules, a person may apply 
to the Attorney-General for approval as a relator. The Attorney-General always has 
standing to protect the public interest and so, by lending his name to the application, can 
overcome any lack of standing on the part of the individual concerned. It does not 
appear that this avenue has yet been followed in the resource management context. 
However in theory it remains open to any public interest group, or possibly even a trade 
competitor, who was concerned about being be able to show that they were "affected" 
in terms of the test laid down in Quarantine Waste. 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
Above n 158, 536. 
Word length precludes a lengthy discussion in this paper but see eg Foxley Engineering Ltd v 
Wellington City Council & Mobil Oil NZ Ltd Wl2/94 and discussion in Andrea MacKay 
"Section 104(8) and Trade'Competitors" Unpublished LLB(Hons) paper VUW, 1995. 
See MacKay, above n 218. 
Above n 163; above n 175. 
Planning and Development Select Committee Commentary on Resource Management 
Amendment Bill (No 3) . 
40 
IV EVALUATION 
A Review of the Initial Resource Consent Decision 
The preceding analysis has shown that by virtue of s 296 of the Act, the potential for 
judicial review of appealable consent decisions is limited if not non-existent. Instead, 
this role is assigned to the Planning Tribunal. An examination of the judicial review 
cases concerning non-notification decisions suggests that this position is desirable. The 
applications for review of non-notification decisions have been concerned primarily 
with questions of disputed fact. These questions are unsuited to an application for 
judicial review which is concerned with the manner in which the decision was made, 
not with an evaluation of the case on its merits. The Planning Tribunal, by contrast, is 
ideally suited to the task of reviewing factual evidence and possesses the necessary 
expertise to do so. Furthermore, from the perspective of the participant in the resource 
management process, judicial review may be complex, costly and lengthy process. It 
runs counter to the aims of the resource management reform, which included providing 
a simpler more efficient process, to have a situation in which judicial review is the only 
means of challenging these decisions. 
Another problem with the present position concerning the non-notification of consent 
applications is that no one body has jurisdiction with respect to all aspects of the 
consent process. This has resulted in plaintiffs being obliged to lodge simultaneous 
applications to the Planning Tribunal and the High Court. In Hunt v Auckland City 
Council and St James Group Ltcf222 the plaintiffs alleged that the purported decision of 
the City Council to grant the resource consent was void because the person making the 
decision lacked authority to do so. They also argued that the consent authority had 
erred in granting the consent on a non-notified basis. In relation to the first allegation, 
an application for a declaration was made to the Planning T1ibunal. However in relation 
to the non-notification issue the only avenue of redress was to apply to the High Court 
for interim relief against the Council issuing a new consent otherwise than on a notified 
basis. The two applications were heard on the same day, thus neither judge had the 
benefit of the other's findings. 
In the High Court Blanchard J declined to grant the application for interim relief, 
finding that if the Tribunal did find the original consent to be void, this would result in 
substantial loss to the St J~es Group should the Council be prevented from issuing a 
fresh consent. He found that it would be unreasonable for the plaintiffs to seek such an 
222 A64/94; Unreported, 8 Augusl 1994, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 366/94. 
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injunction unless they were prepared to give an undertaking as to damages. The Judge 
also noted that the plaintiffs had threatened legal action two and a half months before 
they actually launched proceedings. The Planning Tribunal found that the original 
consent was invalidly granted by reason of lack of authority, but noted that it had no 
jurisdiction to consider whether the consent should have been publicly notified. The 
Tribunal declined to make a declaration or issue an enforcement order in relation to the 
invalid consent until the parties had had time to consider the decision. The Council then 
proceeded to grant a new consent on a non-notified basis. Thus despite having shown 
that the original consent was invalidly granted, and having an arguable case that it 
should not have proceeded on a non-notified basis at any rate, the plaintiffs were unable 
to obtain relief. To add insult to injury, the Tribunal awarded costs against the 
objectors on the basis that they had succeeded only on a technicality and had failed to 
establish any of the substantive grounds of their case. The Planning Judge accepted 
that the proceedings were honestly brought, but was doubtful of the propriety of the 
proceedings, given the uncertainty as to whether some of the issues the plaintiffs sought 
to raise were within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or could only be raised in the High 
Court.223 
Not surprisingly, the non-notification issue is the topic of some debate at present. The 
Ministry for the Environment is conducting an investigation into the use of s 94 
although it has not yet established its terms of reference. A coalition of national 
environmental organisations has proposed that the Act be amended to allow appeal 
rights against non-notification decisions, and three of the political parties contesting the 
1996 elections have endorsed this recommendation in principle. 224 The creation of an 
appeal right would also be consistent with recent recommendations of the British Law 
Commission. In their report it is suggested that where a particular jurisdiction throws 
up a large number of judicial review cases, this is an indication that a right of appeal or 
other supervisory review is needed.225 Similarly, it has been noted by academic 
writers that it is preferable for those cases which regularly give rise to factual issues to 
be determined initially by a tribunal whose decisions are then subject to review.226 
Furthermore, it has been argued that an initial appeal to a tribunal preserves the efficacy 
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of judicial review by allowing the courts to focus on cases which concern serious errors 
of law.227 
One final point should be noted in relation to review of the initial consent decision. 
Although in general this paper suggests that judicial review is inappropriate at this stage 
of review, it should be noted that the Court has shown a much more generous approach 
to questions of standing than the Planning Tribunal. The Court has shown much 
greater recognition of the role of public interest groups in protecting the correct 
application of the law. This may stem from the fact that one of the key purposes of 
judicial review is to ensure to ensure that decision makers exercise their powers 
lawfully. By contrast, in the context of the Planning Tribunal, the focus is on more on 
achieving a just result in the individual circumstances. It is submitted that it is seen as 
less important that someone be in a position to challenge the lawfulness of the decision. 
Nevertheless, one of the aims of the resource consent process is to allow public 
participation so as to ensure that the decision maker is fully informed. As noted above, 
it is therefore contradictory to exclude public interest groups who often have the 
relevant expertise to assist in making an accurate decision. 
B Review of Planning Tribunal Decisions 
Questions of standing aside, it does appear that appeal to the Planning Tribunal presents 
the preferable remedy against the decision of a consent authority. The question then 
arises as to whether there is a role for judicial review of the decision of the Planning 
Tribunal itself. The potential for such an application hinges on the difference between 
judicial review and the appeal process provided for under s 299 of the Act. As noted 
above, De Smith suggests that any ground of challenge available under review is also 
available on an appeal on a point of law. Indeed in some respects the two processes are 
very similar. Neither procedure is designed to consider disputed questions of fact, and 
the Court has been at pains to stress this point in both appeal and review actions. 
However it is in the appeal cases that the greatest reluctance to examine factual matters 
has been shown. The Court has stated that on appeal it may defer to the decision of the 
Planning Tribunal even where there is has no evidence to support it. By contrast, in 
Worldwide Leisure, it was found that on an application for judicial review the Court 
would intervene in these circumstances. Examination of the cases decided under the 
RMA demonstrate some further differences. 
227 Sir Harry Woolf "Judicial Review: A Possible Proposal for Reform" [1992] Public Law 221, 
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A general comparison of the two procedures is complicated by the fact that the grounds 
of appeal under s 299 are somewhat unclear. Some of this confusion stems from the 
statement of the grounds of intervention in Countdown Properties. The first, third and 
fourth limbs of the test outlined in that case appear to state different parts of what would 
be viewed as the ground of illegality in a judicial review action. The second limb would 
appear to refer to the ground of unreasonableness. However no reference is made to 
intervention on the ground of procedural impropriety. 
In terms of determining the application of the coITect legal test, an analysis of cases 
such as New 'Zealand Rail suggests that the Court is reluctant on appeal to exercise its 
role of clarifying and developing the law, and ensuring the consistency of its 
application. An analysis of the appeal decisions suggests that there may be a tendency 
to focus on the substantive issues rather than on when the correct procedure has been 
observed. For example in Hunt, the High Court dismissed the argument that the 
Tribunal had failed to take into account the role of the appellants as private enforcers of 
a public right when making a costs award against them. Williams J agreed with the 
submission that there was a general public interest in ensuring that a territorial authority 
exercises its important administrative powers in a lawful way, but declined to set aside 
the costs award of the Tribunal. 228 The fact that a procedural error had in fact been 
established was also insufficient to set aside the order. 
In a similar vein, it is interesting to note the recent decision in the Manos case holding 
that there should be no higher test such as immateriality beyond a reasonable doubt for 
assessing whether an error is immaterial. Again this demonstrates a focus on the 
substantive outcome rather than on the procedure followed. Lord Bingham has stated 
both in the case of R v Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Force, exp 
Cotton229 and extra-judicially230 that the Court should be very slow to conclude that an 
error is immaterial in cases where natural justice has been denied. He gives six reasons 
for this point of view including the proposition that appearances are important, and that 
where a decision maker is under a duty to act fairly the subject of the decision has a 
right to be heard and rights are not lightly to be denied . While the decision in Manos 
concerned the taking into consideration of an irrelevant fact rather than a breach of 
natural justice, it still may be argued that the Court should require a higher test such as 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It appears therefore that judicial review might be 
more effective than appeal in ensuring that the coITect legal test has been applied. 
228 
229 
230 
Above n 88, 56. 
[1990) IRLR 344, 352. 
Above n 147, 72. 
Judicial review may also be the only remedy available on the ground of procedural 
impropriety. An examination of the cases gives no clear indication whether this ground 
will be available on appeal under s 299. While the summary of the Court's grounds of 
intervention in Countdown does not make reference to procedural propriety, the Court 
did not instantly dismiss the appellants' arguments on this ground. It should be noted 
that there has not been much focus either on procedural propriety in the RMA judicial 
review cases. However it is clear that this ground would be available on a judicial 
review action. 
One respect in which appeal might possibly provide a wider basis for review is where 
the decision maker is alleged to have acted unreasonably. It is clear from Worldwide 
Leisure, that on review the test is for unreasonableness in the public law sense of the 
phrase. However it has been noted in the appeal cases the position is less clear, with 
some dicta to suggest that ordinary reasonableness will suffice. 
Finally, it is interesting to examine briefly the remedies available under the different 
procedures. It is clearly established that judicial review remedies are discretionary. 
However it appears that the Court also has the discretion to decline a remedy on appeal. 
In Habgood it was suggested that "as a matter of common sense" a decision should not 
be set aside where the error was immaterial, which suggests some element of 
discretion. The recent decision in Manos enhances that discretion by finding that 
materiality is a question of judgment rather than of proof to a standard. Another 
interesting point from Habgood is the statement by the Court that it should not exercise 
its power under the High Court rules to substitute its own decision for that of the 
Tribunal. Interestingly, this removes one of the distinctions between the remedies 
available on review and appeal. This distinction was identified by the Franks 
Committee as a reason for preferring appeal from decisions of an administrative 
tribunal.231 
On balance, therefore, it appears that some differences can be detected in the role of the 
Court on review and appeal. In particular, it seems that the focus of appeal is more on 
the substantive outcome of decision than on the procedures followed. This is evidenced 
by the decisions relating to application of the correct legal test, and by the absence of 
any reference to procedural improp1iety as a ground of intervention on appeal. The 
present approach to appeal appears to be fulfilling one of the functions of judicial 
scrutiny in terms of protecti!1g the rights of the individual. However it does not do so 
well at fulfilling its role of protecting the public interest in the faithful and correct 
231 Above n 14, para 107. 
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application of the law. While judicial review is also concerned with protecting the 
rights of the individual, it can be argued that it places a greater emphasis on the process 
by which the decision is reached. It is submitted that in this respect, judicial review 
may be a preferable means of challenging a decision of the Planning Tribunal. There 
may yet be a role for judicial review of Tribunal decisions. 
V CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that judicial scrutiny has an important part to play in ensuring that the 
powers of consent authorities are exercised faithfully and correctly. It has also been 
seen that the courts have a role in developing and clarifying the tests to be applied by the 
authorities. For the most part, the role of judicial scrutiny under the RMA is carried out 
by the Planning Tribunal and the Court on appeal. The scope of judicial review is 
limited by s 296 of the Act, and to date it has not played a large role in the consent 
process. While a number of judicial review cases have been brought against non-
notification decisions, these cases tend to demonstrate that review is not ideally suited to 
the scrutiny of initial decisions of consent authorities. This function is better carried out 
by an appeal to the Planning Tribunal, a body which has the jurisdiction and expertise 
to re-examine the facts of the case. 
However there may be a role for judicial review of Planning Tribunal decisions 
themselves. It appears that on the Court's present interpretation, an appeal under s 299 
does not include all the grounds available on an application for judicial review. In 
particular, the appeal decisions do not appear to provide much focus on the procedural 
aspects of Tribunal decisions. Nor does the Court appear to be fulfilling, on appeal, its 
role of clarifying and ensuring consistency in the legal tests to be applied under the Act. 
It is submitted, therefore, that in certain circumstances the Court should not exercise its 
discretion to deny relief on an application for review. Given the very significant impact 
of resource consent decisions, it is vital that correct procedures are followed and that a 
consistent approach to granting consents is developed. Judicial review is ideally suited 
to ensuring consistency of process. It appears there may be scope under the Act for it 
to fulfil this function. 
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APPENDIX 
3. Meaning of "effect"--
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the term "effect" [] includes--
(a) Any positive or adverse effect; and 
(b) Any temporary or permanent effect; and 
(c) Any past, present, or future effect; and 
(d) Any cumulative effect which arises over time or in combination with other effects--
regardless of the scale, intensity, duration, or frequency of the effect, and also 
includes--
(e) Any potential effect of high probability; and 
(f) Any potential effect of low probability which has a high potential impact. 
5. Purpose--
(1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources. 
(2) In this Act, "sustainable management" means managing the use, development, and 
protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables 
people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural 
wellbeing and for their health and safety while--
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; 
and 
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment. 
94. Applications Not Requiring Notification--
Cl) An application for--
(a) A subdivision consent need not be notified in accordance with section 93, if the 
subdivision is a controlled activity: 
(b) A [resource] consent need not be notified in accordance with section 93, if the 
activity to which the application relates is a controlled activity and the plan expressly 
permits consideration of the application without the need to obtain the written 
approval of affected persons: 
(c) Any other resource consent that relates to a controlled activity need not be notified in 
accordance with section 93, if--
(i) The activity to which the application relates is a controlled activity; and 
(ii) Written approval has been obtained from every person who, in the opinion of 
the consent authority, may be adversely affected by the granting of the resource 
consent unless, in the authority's opinion, it is unreasonable in the 
circumstances to require the obtaining of every such approval. 
[(lA) An application for a resource consent need not be notified in accordance with 
section 93 if--
(a) The activity to which the application relates is a discretionary activity over which the 
consent authority has restricted the exercise of its discretion; and 
(b) The plan expressly permits consideration of the application without the need to 
obtain the written approval of affected persons.] 
(2) An application for a resource consent need not be notified in accordance with section 
93, if the application relates to a discretionary activity or a non-complying activity 
and--
(a) The consent authority is satisfied that the adverse effect on the environment of the 
activity for which consent is sought will be minor; and 
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(b) Written approval has been obtained from every person whom the consent authority 
is satisfied may be adversely affected by the granting of the resource consent unless 
the authority considers it is unreasonable in the circumstances to require the 
obtaining of every such approval. 
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(3) An application for a resource consent need not be notified in accordance with section 
93, if the application is for a resource consent to do something that would otherwise 
contravene any of sections 12 (1), 13, 14 (1), or 15 (1) and--
(a) There is no relevant plan or proposed plan; and 
(b) The consent authority is satisfied that the adverse effect on the environment of the 
activity for which the consent is sought will be minor; and 
(c) Written approval has been obtained from every person who, in the opinion of the 
consent authority, may be adversely affected by the granting of the resource consent 
unless, in the authority's opinion, it is unreasonable in the circumstances to require 
the obtaining of every such approval. 
(4) In determining whether or not the adverse effect on the environment of any activity 
will be minor for the purposes of subsection (2) (a) or subsection (3) (b) a consent 
authority shall take no account of the effect of the activity on any person whose 
written approval has been obtained in accordance with subsection (2) (b) or 
subsection (3) (c). 
[(5) Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (3), if a consent authority considers special 
circumstances exist in relation to any such application, it may require the application 
to be notified in accordance with section 93, even if a relevant plan expressly 
provides that it need not be so notified.] 
96. Making of submissions--
(1) Any person may make a submission to a consent authority about an 
application for a resource consent that is notified in accordance with section 93. 
120. Right to appeal--
(1) Any one or more of the following persons may appeal to the Planning 
Tribunal in accordance with section 121 against the whole or any part of a 
decision of a consent authority [, except a decision of the Minister of 
Conservation under section 119,] on an application for a resource consent, 
or an application for a change of consent conditions, or on a review of 
consent conditions: 
(a) The applicant or consent holder: 
(b) Any person who made a submission on the application or review of consent 
conditions 
27 4. Representation at proceedings--
Cl) In proceedings before the Planning Tribunal under this Act, the Minister, any loc~l 
authority, any person having any interest in the proceedings greater than the public 
generally, and any party to the proceedings, may appear and may call evidence on 
any matter that should be taken into account in dete~ining the proceedi~gs. 
(2) Where any person who is not a party to the proceedings bef~re the ~lanmng 
Tribunal under this Act wishes to appear, that person shall give notice to the 
Tribunal and every party not less than 10 working days before the commencement 
of the hearing. 
296. No review of decisions unless right of appeal or reference to 
inquiry exercised.--
If there is a right to refer any matter for inquiry to 
the Planning Tribunal or to appeal to the Tribunal against a decision of a local authority, 
consent authority or any person under this Act or under any other Act or regulation--
Ca) No application for review under Part I of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 
may be made; and 
(b) No proceedings seeking a writ of, or in the nature of, mandamus, prohibition, 
or certiorari, or a declaration or injunction in relation to that decision, may be heard 
by the High Court--
unless the right has been exercised by the applicant in the proceedings and the Tribunal 
has made a decision. 
299. Appeal on a question of law--
(1) Any party to any proceedings before the Planning Tribunal under this Act, or 
another Act, or regulation, may appeal against the decision or report and 
recommendation of the Tribunal to the High Court on a point of law. 
(2) Repealed. 
(3) An appeal under this section shall be made in accordance with the High Court Rules 
except to any extent that those rules are inconsistent with sections 300 to 307. 
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